China’s economy is buried under a great wall of debt and Xi Jinping’s answer is to add more bricks. The president has sanctioned an extraordinary programme of borrowing by the central government to steer the $18 trillion behemoth to “high quality development”. In doing so, he is piling risk onto the country’s last decent balance sheet.

There is nothing new in the Chinese central government taking on more debt in a time of crisis. But the latest plan, outlined in March by the State Council, to sell special sovereign bonds with maturities of up to 50 years is a departure from a tested formula.

Such debts used to be indeed special, with only three new issuances by the People’s Republic before last month. All had a one-off policy goal or specific emergency to deal with, such as bailing out insolvent state-owned banks in 1998. This time, the government will sell 1 trillion yuan ($138 billion) in ultra-long-dated, special sovereign bonds. These issues will continue over “each of the next several years”, and the policy goals are broad.

Much of the proceeds will be used for investment to support “major national strategies”, per the State Council. Beijing would help finance the construction cost of schools and hospitals in grain-producing counties, for instance, to reinforce food security and thereby China’s self-sufficiency. Additionally, new industries such as semiconductors, electric vehicles and artificial intelligence will be prioritised as China races to establish a growth model led by domestic consumption, a green economy and innovation, rather than one that depends on infrastructure, land and labour.

Taking on more borrowing at the central government also will consolidate Xi’s grip on economic planning and resource allocation, potentially helping China to reduce wasteful investments. Crucially, expanding the central government’s balance sheet will ease the future burden on cash-strapped local governments that are responsible for most spending.

Heavy lifting

Xi’s borrowing plan addresses a problem created by a tax-sharing system introduced in the 1990s which allows Beijing to take a lion’s share of the national tax revenues. By 2022, per Ministry of Finance data, local governments were responsible for nearly 90% of total government expenditure but they needed to make do with about 50% of total government revenue.

The squeeze gave rise to local government financing vehicles, known as LGFVs, and prompted municipalities to lean on property market income including land sales to balance their books. Property incomes accounted for more than 40% of local government income in 2020. It dwindled quickly thereafter due to Xi’s “three red lines”, a deleveraging campaign that ultimately led a Hong Kong court to order the liquidation of Evergrande, the world’s most indebted real estate developer.

Borrowing binge

The additional borrowing is riskier this time. In 1998 China was on the verge of joining the World Trade Organization. Powered by robust exports and a youthful workforce, its trajectory was firmly on the up. Geopolitical tension, however, has taken steam out of the world’s second largest economy. Its sheer size and its existing indebtedness are an issue too.

The central government’s balance sheet remains tidy for now. Its outstanding borrowings amounted to 24% of GDP at the end of 2023, the International Monetary Fund estimates, among the lowest of major economies. If all else remains equal and China issues special sovereign bonds to the tune of 1 trillion yuan each year for the next decade, its borrowings would rise nearly 8 percentage points to almost 32% of last year’s GDP, Breakingviews calculates.

The problems stack up elsewhere, however. Explicit local government debt amounted to another 31% of GDP by the end of 2023, per the IMF, LGFVs account for a further 48%, and other government funds another 13%, bringing the augmented debt up to 116 trillion yuan, about $16 trillion, or 116% of GDP – a 35% increase on 2018, the IMF calculates.

Corporate debt adds another 123% of GDP, much of it issued by state banks and owed by state-owned enterprises, plus there’s household debt at 61% of GDP, per Fidelity which calculates gross debt at over 300% of GDP.

Borrowing more doesn’t sound like “a basket of comprehensive measures” to resolve risks stemming from local government debts, as the ruling Communist Party’s Politburo called for last year. The potential costs of bailing out those authorities and making the shift to the new growth model is why Moody’s and Fitch, two of the three major rating agencies, have put China’s sovereign rating on negative outlook since December.

More than two decades ago Zhu Rongji reacted indignantly to Hong Kong newspapers’ assessment that he was China’s “deficit premier” when his government started selling long-term construction bonds at smaller amounts. He insisted his cabinet was investing in quality assets, for future generations of the People’s Republic. This gamble paid off and the projects, including a power grid and an extensive mobile telecommunication network, laid the foundation for decades of growth.

By the time the new wave of sovereign debt matures, the People’s Republic would be celebrating its 100th anniversary and, if all goes well according to Xi’s plan, it will be a “strong and modern socialist country”. Long before then, however, it will be clear whether China can defy a debt crisis, as it has done so for decades, and simultaneously revive growth. There will be even less room to borrow its way out of problems next time.