Norsk

Motstand til engelsk i Norge har vĂŠrt i stor grad et hĂžyrepolitisk fenomen i min opplevelse. Norske kommunister som jeg har mĂžtt har ikke engasjert seg i sprĂ„kpolitikk i det hele tatt — kommunister i Norge bruker lĂ„nord fra engelsk, og snakker engelsk, like ofte som liberalister, og har i stor grad de samme meningene om sprĂ„kpolitikk som liberalister. Jeg ville da sagt at sprĂ„kpolitikk er en stor blindsone for norske kommunister.

Denne situasjonen minner meg om Storbritannia, der motstand til EU ble sĂ„ sterkt tilknyttet reaksjonĂŠr hĂžyrepolitikk at progressive briter nektet Ă„ hĂžre pĂ„ venstrepolitisk kritikk av EU: “de onde toskene hater EU, derfor burde jeg stĂžtte EU!” — man har vel bare sĂ„ mye energi man kan bruke pĂ„ Ă„ gruble over forskjellige problemer i verden, sĂ„ det blir kanskje litt lett Ă„ falle inni denne tankemĂ„ten, ikke sant? Og siden motstanderne til engelsk i Norge er som oftest overdramatiske, rare, reaksjonĂŠre, eller “anti-moro”, sĂ„ blir det lett for progressive nordmenn Ă„ anta at reaksjonisme er et grunnleggende trekk til motstand til engelsk i Norge, og at denne posisjonen er derfor ikke verdt Ă„ vurdere om man Ăžnsker Ă„ vĂŠre progressiv. “Det kommer nye lĂ„nord, men sĂ„nn har det alltid vĂŠrt,” sier de.

For Ă„ komme til en proletar anti-engelsk mĂ„ vi fĂžrst utforske den borgerlige anti-engelsken. Jeg har lest en debattartikkel skrevet av en student som heter Elias Kristofer SĂŠtermo, som jeg tror representerer den typiske borgerlige anti-engelsken — artikkelen var jo lagt ut pĂ„ VGs nettside, og VG er en borgerlig avis. Gjennom hele artikkelen tar SĂŠtermo for gitt at Norge og norsk identitet mĂ„ eksistere, at “norske verdier” bĂ„de finnes og er gode, og at disse blir “truet” av “ytre krefter” og at vi mĂ„ “sikre en fremtid for det norske nasjonale prosjektet” (ĂŠsj!), og SĂŠtermo oppfĂžrer seg nesten som om kulturell endring er i seg selv dĂ„rlig, om disse endringene er uten “norske rĂžtter” (hva enn dette skal bety). SĂŠtermos anti-engelsk har ganske klart mye tilfelles med reaksjonĂŠr motstand til innvandring, inkluderende sammenligningen med urfolk. SĂŠtermo har tydeligvis merket overfloden av engelsk i vĂ„rt samfunn, men, uten kunnskapen for en god analyse, har tatt bekymringene sine i en reaksjonĂŠr nasjonalistisk retning.

Det interessante som SĂŠtermo sier er at “norsk sprĂ„k mĂ„ fremmes i underholdning, i musikken og pĂ„ sosiale medier” og at “et sprĂ„k er et sosialt lim”.

Hmm. Jeg selv ville sagt at Norge som en nasjon, samt norsk identitet, er begge borgerlige oppfinnelser, og at “norske verdier” er da borgerlige verdier — til og med det norske sprĂ„ket selv er en borgerlig oppfinnelse! Vi har i Norge mange forskjellige dialekter som kan vĂŠre vanskelige Ă„ forstĂ„, og om man kan norsk kan man vel forstĂ„ svensk og dansk til en grad ogsĂ„. Man kunne da like godt argumentert at trĂžndersk og sĂžrlandsk er forskjellige sprĂ„k, eller at norsk og svensk er det samme sprĂ„ket. SĂ„ “et sosialt lim” er nettopp hva norsk er: vi ser dialektnivellering i Norge fordi folk flytter rundt for arbeid, fordi mediene i Norge fremmer noen dialekter og gjĂžr narr av andre, og fordi skriftsprĂ„kene selv representerer og fremmer “normative” norsker. Hva er da “tradisjonelt” med norsk?

Det norske borgerskapet vil forminske regionale identiteter for Ă„ fremme deres idĂ© om en felles norskhet — dette er formĂ„let til dialektnivellering. Det norske borgerskapet vil at vi skal snakke norsk og se pĂ„ og hĂžre pĂ„ og lese deres borgerlige medier, slik at de kan propagandisere oss til Ă„ ha en norsk borgerlig mentalitet. SĂ„ dette er hva det norske borgerskapet frykter nĂ„r folk er i dag sĂ„ hektet pĂ„ seppolandske filmer og kjendiser: “du er hva du spiser”, og nĂ„r folk sluker opp borgerlig seppolandsk kultur, sĂ„ vil de fĂ„ en borgerlig seppolandsk mentalitet — akkurat som nĂ„r de sluker opp borgerlig norsk kultur, sĂ„ fĂ„r de en borgerlig norsk mentalitet. At kapitalistene innen Norges kulturindustri klager om at deres industri er ikke lĂžnnsom nok, og fremstiller dette som “en eksistensiell trussel imot Norge”, er da ikke sĂ„ annerledes fra seppolandske kapitalister innen kabel-TV sin alarmisme om Internett og streaming: arbeidernes fokus pĂ„ nasjonal-borgerlige medier er en noksĂ„ stor del av det nasjonale borgerskapets kontroll over landets arbeidere.

Men vi mÄ fortsatt huske at det var det norske borgerskapet selv som valgte Ä la engelsk bli til en samfunnsmakt. Dette vil si at det norske borgerskapet tjener fra nettopp det som de klager om. Hvordan?

FĂžrste punkt: Vestlig identitet

Det norske borgerskapet kan bare beskytte dets imperiale interesser gjennom allianse med andre land i den imperiale kjernen. Dette nĂždvendiggjĂžr en fellesidentitet for arbeidere i den imperiale kjernen, altsĂ„ et fellessprĂ„k og en felleskultur for hele denne alliansen. Denne “hvite” eller “vestlige” identiteten stĂ„r da i konflikt med den “norske” identiteten: det norske borgerskapets frykt er at de mister kontroll over arbeidernes identitet, og norsk identitet blir da erstattet i sin helhet av den imperiale identiteten. Det norske borgerskapet mĂ„ da holde disse to identitetene i en balanse. Denne balansen blir holdt gjennom bl.a. alarmisme om “amerikanisering”.

Andre punkt: Mobilitet

NÄr nordmenn kan engelsk, kan norske bedrifter lettere etablere seg og markedsfÞre og spre propaganda i andre land, sende nordmenn til andre land for arbeid og fÄ nordmenn til Ä jobbe sammen med folk fra andre land. Med andre ord, imperialismen med dens evig Þkonomisk utvidelse til andre land krever at medarbeidere kan snakke sammen, at sjefen kan snakke sammen med arbeidere, at kapitalister kan snakke sammen med hverandre, osv. Det som gjÞr det norske borgerskapet nervÞs er at, nÄr enn de selv tjener fra at nordmenn kan engelsk, sÄ tjener Seppoland mer fra at deres sprÄk har blitt verdenssprÄket. Det norske borgerskapet Þnsker da selvfÞlgelig Ä maksimere makten som de fÄr fra engelsk, og forminske makten som Seppoland fÄr tilbake.

Tredje punkt: Eksklusjon

Norsk imperialisme er ikke bare bygget pĂ„ at norske kapitalister utnytter resurser og arbeidere i utlandet, men at utenlandske arbeidere blir importert til Norge — arbeidere kjĂžpt gjennom investeringer i krig og krise i disse fremmede landene. Verdien stjelt gjennom super-utnyttelsen av innvandrer-arbeidere i Norge betaler for kjĂžpet av lokalfĂždte arbeideres lojalitet til kapitalisme. Denne ordningen krever at kapitalistene skaper en skille mellom “innvandrere” og “lokalfĂždte”. Én mĂ„te Ă„ skape denne skillen er gjennom sprĂ„k: Ă„ kunne norsk pĂ„fĂžrer mange privilegier, mest merkverdig er at naturalisering i Norge krever at man har nĂ„dd B1-nivĂ„ (tidligere A2-nivĂ„) i muntlig norsk. At kravet ble hevd viser at det norske borgerskapet justerer naturaliseringssystemet nĂ„r enn dette trengs.

NĂ„r nordmenn kan engelsk, skaper dette enda mer fleksibilitet for Ă„ utelukke innvandrere fra privilegier. Kassedamen snakker engelsk til deg, fordi du er en “utlending”; bussjĂ„fĂžren snakker engelsk til deg, fordi du er en “utlending”. Arbeidsplassen din snakker engelsk, fordi du kan ikke skaffe arbeid hos en norsktalende arbeidsplass. Du sĂžker opp norske artister, men halvparten synger pĂ„ engelsk. Du ser pĂ„ TV men mer enn halvparten er seppolandske filmer og serier. NĂ„r evnen din til Ă„ lĂŠre norsk gjennom poppkultur er forminsket, nĂ„r stedet der du bruker stordelen av dagen din snakker engelsk, og nĂ„r hvem enn du snakker til kan nĂ„r som helst bytte til engelsk, fĂ„r du rett og slett fĂŠrre sjanser til Ă„ forbedre norsken din — som betyr at du er mer avhengig av klasserommet. Og klasserommet, selvfĂžlgelig, finnes ikke for Ă„ lĂŠre deg norsk sĂ„ raskt som mulig: klasserommet finnes for Ă„ lĂŠre deg norsk sĂ„ raskt som er nyttig for borgerskapet, dette vil si, sakte nok at du vil ikke forstyrre balansen mellom “innvandrere” og “lokalfĂždte”.

Konklusjon

Det engelske sprĂ„ket i Norge fremmer imperialisme. Nekter man engelsk og det sprĂ„kets innflytelse pĂ„ norsk, sĂ„ nekter man “vestlig” identitet; nekter man dette, sĂ„ nekter man profitt for borgerskapet, bĂ„de i Norge og i Seppoland; nekter man dette, sĂ„ nekter man utnyttelsen av innvandrere. Samtidig mĂ„ vi nekte det borgerlige monopolet over kultur og sprĂ„k i Norge, som har alltid vĂŠrt fienden til Norges mangfold, og som har som sitt formĂ„l Ă„ fremme kollaborasjon med borgerskapet.

NÄr nordmenn lÊrer om kommunisme fra Adam Tahir, er dette ikke internasjonalisme, men heller importeringen av pseudovenstre hjerneormer fra en bosettingskoloni med liten sjanse for ekte klassebevissthet. NÄr nordmenn lÊrer om kommunisme men kan ikke si hva noen av Marx sine idéer heter pÄ norsk, er dette ikke internasjonalisme, det er kulturimperialisme i venstrepolitiske klÊr. Den ekte internasjonalismen vil si at engelsktalende vil lÊre seg norsk, om de vokste ikke opp tosprÄklig, og vil oversette deres tekster fra engelsk til norsk. Internasjonalisme handler om samarbeid mellom land, og ikke at ett lands sprÄk og kultur skal dominere over andre.

English

Opposition to English in Norway has been largely a right-wing phenomenon in my experience. Norwegian communists I’ve met have not been at all interested in language politics — they use loanwords from English and speak English just as often as liberals, and have largely the same views on language politics as liberals. I would then say that language politics is a big blind zone for Norwegian communists.

This situation reminds me of the UK, where opposition to the EU became so closely associated with right-wing reactionism that progressive Britons refused to listen to left-wing critiques of the EU: “The evil dipshits hate the EU, so I should support the EU!” — one has after all only so much energy to expend on contemplating the world’s many problems, so it’s perhaps a bit easy to fall into this type of rationale, right? And since the opponents of the English language in Norway are most often over-dramatic, weird, reactionary, or “anti-fun”, it becomes easy for progressive Norwegians to assume that reactionism is an inherent characteristic of opposition to English in Norway, and that this position is therefore not worth considering if one wishes to be progressive. “There will be new loanwords, but that’s how it’s always been,” they’ll say.

To arrive at a proletarian anti-English we must first explore the bourgeois anti-English. I have read an opinion piece written by a student named Elias Kristofer Sétermo, that I think represents the typical bourgeois anti-English — the piece was after all posted on VG’s website, and VG is a bourgeois publication. Throughout the whole article Sétermo takes for granted that Norway and Norwegian identity must exist, that “Norwegian values” both exist and are good, and that these are “threatened” by “external forces” and we must “secure a future for the Norwegian national project” (ew!), and Sétermo acts almost as if cultural change is in itself a bad thing, if these changes are without “Norwegian roots” (whatever this is supposed to mean). Sétermo’s anti-English clearly has much in common with reactionary opposition to immigration, including the comparison with Native peoples. Sétermo has clearly noticed the flood of English in our society but, lacking the knowledge for a good analysis, has taken his worries in a reactionary nationalist direction.

The interesting thing that Sétermo says is that “the Norwegian language must be promoted in entertainment, in music and on social media” and that “a language is a social glue”.

Hmm. I would myself say that Norway as a nation, and Norwegian identity, are both bourgeois inventions, and that “Norwegian values” are then bourgeois values — even the Norwegian language itself is a bourgeois invention! We have in Norway many different dialects that can be difficult to understand, and Norwegian speakers generally have the ability to understand some amount of Swedish and Danish as well. One could then just as well argue that Trþnder and Southern Norwegian are different languages, or that Norwegian and Swedish are the same language. So a “social glue” is exactly what Norwegian is: we see dialect leveling in Norway because people move around for work, because media in Norway promotes some dialects and makes fun of others, and because the written languages themselves represent and promote “normative” Norwegians. What is then “traditional” about Norwegian?

The Norwegian bourgeoisie wishes to minimize regional identities to promote their idea of a common Norwegianness — this is the aim of dialect leveling. The Norwegian bourgeoisie wants us to speak Norwegian and watch and listen to and read bourgeois media, such that they can propagandize us to have a Norwegian bourgeois mentality. So this is what the Norwegian bourgeoisie fears when people are hooked on Seppolandic movies and celebrities: “you are what you eat,” and when people eat up bourgeois Seppolandic culture, they will get a bourgeois Seppolandic mentality — just like when they eat up bourgeois Norwegian culture, they will get a bourgeois Norwegian mentality. That the capitalists of Norway’s cultural industry complain that their industry is not profitable enough, and present this fact as “an existential threat against Norway”, is then not so different from Seppolandic cable TV capitalists’ alarmism about the Internet and streaming: the workers’ focus on national bourgeois media is a pretty big part of the national bourgeoisie’s control over the country’s workers.

But we must still remember that it was the Norwegian bourgeoisie itself that chose to let English become a societal power. This is to say that the Norwegian bourgeoisie profits from exactly the same thing that they complain about. How can this be?

First point: Western identity

The Norwegian bourgeoisie can only protect its imperial interests through alliance with other countries in the imperial core. This necessitates a common identity for workers in the imperial core, i.e. a common language and common culture for the whole alliance. This “white” or “Western” identity then stands in conflict with the “Norwegian” identity: the Norwegian bourgeoisie’s fear is that they will lose control over the workers’ identity, and Norwegian identity will then be replaced in its entirety by the imperial identity. The Norwegian bourgeoisie must then keep these two identities in balance. This balance is kept through alarmism about “Americanization” among other things.

Second point: Mobility

When Norwegians can speak English, Norwegian business can more easily establish themselves and do marketing and spread propaganda in foreign countries, send Norwegians to foreign countries for work and get Norwegians to work with people from foreign countries. In other words, imperialism with its eternal economic expansion into foreign countries requires that coworkers can communicate, that the boss can talk to the workers, that capitalists can communicate with one another, etc. What makes the Norwegian bourgeoisie nervous is that whenever they profit from Norwegians’ proficiency in English, Seppoland profits more from that their language is the world language. The Norwegian bourgeoisie of course wishes then to maximize the power they get from English and minimize the power that Seppoland gets in return.

Third point: Exclusion

Norwegian imperialism is not only built on Norwegian capitalists exploiting resources and workers in foreign countries, but that foreign workers get imported to Norway — workers bought through investments in war and crisis in these foreign countries. The value stolen through the super-exploitation of migrant workers in Norway pays for the purchase of local-born workers’ loyalty to capitalism. This arrangement requires that the capitalists create a divide between “immigrants” and “locals”. One way to create this divide is through language: speaking Norwegian grants many privileges, most notably that naturalization in Norway requires a B1 (formerly A2) in spoken Norwegian. That the requirement was raised shows that the Norwegian bourgeoisie adjusts the naturalization system whenever this is necessary.

When Norwegians speak English, this creates even more flexibility for excluding immigrants from privileges. The cashier speaks English to you because you are a “foreigner”. The bus driver speaks English to you because you are a “foreigner”. Your workplace speaks English because you can’t get a job at a Norwegian-speaking workplace. You look up Norwegian musicians but half of them sing in English. You watch TV but more than half is Seppolandic movies and shows. When your ability to learn Norwegian through pop culture is minimized, when the place where you spend the largest share of your day speaks English, and when whoever you talk to can switch to English at any point, you quite simply get fewer chances to improve your Norwegian — which makes you more dependent on the classroom. And the classroom, of course, does not exist to teach you Norwegian as quickly as possible: the classroom exists to teach you Norwegian as quickly as is useful for the bourgeoisie, which is to say, slowly enough that you don’t disturb the balance between “immigrants” and “locals”.

Conclusion

The English language in Norway promotes imperialism. If you reject English and its influence on Norwegian, you reject “Western” identity; if you reject this, you reject profits for the bourgeoisie in both Norway and Seppoland; if you reject this, you reject the exploitation of immigrants. Simultaneously we must reject the bourgeois monopoly over culture and language in Norway, which has always been the enemy of Norway’s diversity, and has as its aim to further class collaborationism.

When Norwegians learn about communism from Adam Tahir, this is not internationalism, this is the importation of pseudo-left brainworms from a settler colony with little chance for true class consciousness. When Norwegians learn about communism but cannot say what any of Marx’s ideas are called in Norwegian, this is not internationalism, this is cultural imperialism in leftist clothes. The real internationalism would be for Anglophones to learn Norwegian, if they didn’t grow up bilingual, and translating their texts from English to Norwegian. Internationalism is about cooperation between countries, not that one country’s language and culture should dominate over others.

  • AssortedBiscuits [they/them]@hexbear.net
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    5 days ago

    This isn’t really related to your post, but I remember seeing footage of a Danish crew of a ship that was targeted by a Yemeni drone and it was a bizarre experience to hear people speak in some bizarre English/Danish mix. The combination of people speaking English phrases and Danish phrases with obvious English cognates (incoming drone = inkommen(?) drone) meant that I understood about 40% of what they’re saying despite not being exposed to Danish at all.

    The real kicker is the way they said one of the English phrases “Action Sea Sparrow.” The way they say “action” strike me as them trying to put on an NA accent, so it’s not just them speaking English but (North) American English. Their é vowel was pretty high, which is in contrast to modern Standard Southern British English (SSBE) where the trap vowel is lowered to the point that some linguists use a instead of é for the trap vowel. But standard American English still retains é. Standard American English also raises and diphthongizes the trap vowel when it comes before nasals, so ham is /hɛəm/ instead of /hém/.

    SAE: /hɛəm/
    SSBE: /ham/

    I suspect this was another reason why the Danes were raising their é vowel. The SSBE way of pronouncing the trap vowel would’ve been easier for most Europeans, but they have to go out of their way to sound like Burgerlanders.

    When Norwegians speak English, what English dialect are they drawing from?

    • Erika3sis [she/her, xe/xem]@hexbear.netOP
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      5 days ago

      I suspect this was another reason why the Danes were raising their é vowel. The SSBE way of pronouncing the trap vowel would’ve been easier for most Europeans, but they have to go out of their way to sound like Burgerlanders.

      I’m not sure if I would assign so much significance to this.

      When Norwegians speak English, what English dialect are they drawing from?

      Throughout my whole public education we were always taught British English. I would even hear stories about children of Usonian immigrants getting worse grades in English class because of their pronunciation, spelling, word choice, or grammar — this never happened to me because I had good teachers, at most I would sometimes butt heads with the teacher and go “I don’t say that!” and she’d say “Yeah, it’s a British thing, sorry.” and I’d pipe down, eventually learning to assume that every “weird” thing the teacher said was a British thing.

      However, outside of the classroom, I would say that Norwegians tend to imitate Usonians more than Britons, in my experience. I suspect this might not only be a result of Seppolandic culture having prestige over British culture, but also because, British English being what’s taught in school, that form of English might end up being associated with the classroom, with the teacher’s authority and age, and so Usonian English might be more appealing as an accent of youth culture. That’s just an idea, though.

      I don’t think Norwegians necessarily speak or try to speak a “pure” Usonian accent, however. I hear some mixing and matching of features from both British English and Usonian English.