It’s worth noting that CVE-2022-21587, an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) bug carrying a near-maximum 9.8 CVSS rating, was added to CISA’s known exploited vulnerability (KEV) catalog in February 2023.
Since introducing the KEV catalog, CISA has always been cagey about the degree to which federal agencies meet these deadlines, but this case shows they aren’t always being met.
After gaining that access, the red team injected a persistent RAT and later discovered unsecured admin credentials, which essentially meant it was game over for the agency being assessed.
After CISA eventually put the agency out of its misery, weekly meetings were held with its security team and sysadmins which led to “measurable improvements in response times for known techniques and behavior-based detections that uncovered previously unknown tradecraft.”
The assessed agency also placed too great a reliance on known indicators of compromise (IoCs) for detecting intrusions, plus various system misconfigurations and procedural issues hindered the analysis of network activity.
CISA said the exercise demonstrated the need for FCEB agencies to apply defense-in-depth principles – multiple layers of detection and analysis measures for maximum effectiveness.
The original article contains 1,164 words, the summary contains 183 words. Saved 84%. I’m a bot and I’m open source!
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It’s worth noting that CVE-2022-21587, an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) bug carrying a near-maximum 9.8 CVSS rating, was added to CISA’s known exploited vulnerability (KEV) catalog in February 2023.
Since introducing the KEV catalog, CISA has always been cagey about the degree to which federal agencies meet these deadlines, but this case shows they aren’t always being met.
After gaining that access, the red team injected a persistent RAT and later discovered unsecured admin credentials, which essentially meant it was game over for the agency being assessed.
After CISA eventually put the agency out of its misery, weekly meetings were held with its security team and sysadmins which led to “measurable improvements in response times for known techniques and behavior-based detections that uncovered previously unknown tradecraft.”
The assessed agency also placed too great a reliance on known indicators of compromise (IoCs) for detecting intrusions, plus various system misconfigurations and procedural issues hindered the analysis of network activity.
CISA said the exercise demonstrated the need for FCEB agencies to apply defense-in-depth principles – multiple layers of detection and analysis measures for maximum effectiveness.
The original article contains 1,164 words, the summary contains 183 words. Saved 84%. I’m a bot and I’m open source!