The Working Group,²⁵ an unofficial Jewish organization formed to help protect Jews from anti‐Semitic forces, had for some time exploited every means of ensuring the survival of the Jewish people of Slovakia. One of the tactics used by the Working Group to stop Jewish deportations was to prove to those in the Slovak government charged with expanding the economy that Jews were a vital asset to their cause.

[…]

In June the SD [Sicherheitsdienst] reported that the deportation of Jews was very unpopular with the Slovak population and blamed this unpopularity on the clerics and “English propaganda.”³³ The pressure was so significant that Prime Minister Tiso specifically requested that he not be told anything about the deportations. An SD report states a fear expressed by Mach that Tiso would not be able to stand up to the pressure of the clerics. Another speaks of Tuka’s loyalty to the cause but states that he was thwarted by “clever maneuvering.”³⁴

The clever maneuvering to which the report referred is almost certainly the efforts of the Working Group. The Working Group reached out with appeals to the morality and compassion of some government officials but more often with bribes. For example, Josef Sivak towed the party line with regard to the Jews well enough to “pass muster” but was in fact also a close friend of Rabbi Frieder, a member of the Working Group.

Sivak was appointed Minister of Education and Culture and gave Frieder a secret phone number that allowed them to stay in direct contact. He warned the Working Group of planned measures and during the deportations did what he could to ensure Jewish schoolmasters were excluded.³⁵

In other cases, it was necessary to bribe officials, as was the case with the head of the president’s bureau, Dr. Isidor Koso. In fact, it was from Koso that the Working Group first learned of the planned deportations. They responded by quickly putting forward the plan for Steiner’s labor camps but feared that by the time the camps were fully established, there would be no Jews left. They then sought to bribe the head of Department 14, the government department in charge of solving “the Jewish question” in Slovakia, Dr. Anton Vasek, “the Jew King.”

They not only appealed to his bank account but also to his vanity, encouraging him to write a book about his fascinating life in politics. This was so successful that Vasek arranged for several transports already scheduled to leave the country to encounter technical difficulties that caused lengthy delays.

Koso and Vasek seem to be examples of Slovak officials that were described as wanting “money, motor‐cars, resounding title’s [sic], and the maximum of personal pomp and circumstance. They seem to have been quite indifferent to the means by which these things were obtained.”³⁶

The Working Group’s attempts to bribe the Slovak officials produced such success that the Group even went so far as to meet with the German [Reich’s] representative Dieter Wisliceny. They enlisted a corrupt member of the official Jewish Committee named Hochberg, who was familiar with Wisliceny, to present the equivalent of $40,000 as a bribe to the German. Hochberg pocketed half of the sum and only presented Wisliceny with $20,000.³⁷ However, the German accepted that amount immediately before a scheduled visit to Berlin for consultation.

[…]

Wisliceny continued to appear to cooperate with the Working Group, even going so far as to report upcoming activities that might lead to the resumption of the deportations. Steiner, Wisliceny’s primary contact, became so emboldened by his manner and continued cooperation he once asked Wisliceny, “if he so much wanted to help the Jews why was he in charge of the expulsions?” to which Wisliceny reportedly replied that he was not an anti‐Semite but was doing his duty as a German soldier.⁴²

Steiner continued to work with Wisliceny and also to work on improving and expanding the Jewish labor camps which became more and more important to the Slovak economy.⁴³ These camps differed so greatly from the concentration and labor camps in Germany and Poland that Edith Katz, an imprisoned 21 year old Jewish woman with a heart condition, was transferred to the camp at Novaky because it was thought the environment would be better for her health.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, cultural activities were encouraged within the camps, and members of the Working Group, namely Y.O. Neumann and Steiner, were successful in sneaking weapons into the camps intended for the inmates’ self‐defense.⁴⁵

The efforts of the Working Group to make the Jews an essential asset to the Slovak economy were successful. The religious community succeeded in turning a significant portion of public opinion against renewed deportations. The Working Group bribed certain officials, distracted others with appeals to their vanity, and convicted others with appeals to their humanity.⁴⁶

Though there were many efforts made to renew the deportation of Jews from the region of Slovakia, they were all met with opposition and failed. When concrete plans were presented, politicians openly opposed them.⁴⁷ Roman Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter read in all the Catholic churches of a country that was 80% Catholic, decrying the attempt to resume deportations.⁴⁸

[…]

In August of 1944, there was a rebellion against the HSĽS government and by extension the [Third Reich]. Slovak partisans were encouraged to revolt by [Soviet] authorities who promised military support.⁵⁰ With [the Axis] faring so badly on the Eastern front and the assurances of the [Soviets], the Slovaks believed they could succeed.

They were wrong. [The Greater German Reich], finally freed of diplomatic restraint, attacked in force and quickly quelled the rebellion. 20,000 Jews, almost all which remained in the Slovak Republic, were deported in October and November of 1944. Most of them never returned.

All of the efforts to both stop the deportation trains and keep them from resuming were significant. The influence of the Vatican and both the Catholic and Protestant church was substantial in directing public opinion against the deportations. By providing significant economic incentives, both personal and political, to Slovak and German politicians, the actions of the often marginalized Working Group were undeniable contributing factors in the halt of deportations.

The actions of these groups were seldom conducted in conjunction with each other but nevertheless worked together, placing pressure on Slovak officials to create more and more exemptions.

Yet, the most startling and arguably most important contributor to the halt of deportations remains Germany itself. Few of the other influences and factors previously discussed would have succeeded or even been possible had Germany not allowed Slovakia an unprecedented amount of autonomy. The most compelling evidence for the importance of Germany’s diplomatic policies in the thwarting of its own goals is the fact that the deportation of Jewish Slovaks only resumed when Germany abandoned that diplomacy.

(Emphasis added.)