My position, based on Engels. You gotta add Dialectics: material things can combine in such ways that are not singularly traceable to the material basic components, but instead rely on emergent components when they interact. Consciousness as we understand it IS material but is not understood through vulgar materialism which says that it can be broken down into electric signals/chemicals to be understood entirely. This is the way. Dialectics of Nature.
Nothing “idealist” exists, but things not understood in their complete totality do, and emergence is real. But emergence is material, not Magic. Trying to make a definition of “materialism” which says human consciousness is simple cells, chemicals, and electric is a straw man of good materialist analyses. These definitions are all based in a non-dialectical framework and that’s why they run into the same issues that Plekhanov ran into.
Are you insinuating that Wittgenstein’s position of linguistic disagreements is applicable to differences of idealism and materialism?
Firstly, the word ‘dialectic’ doesn’t mean anything specific outside of context. At most, it carries the meaning of ‘something related to change’, and can refer to anything from people having an argument to a framework with theses, antitheses and syntheses of things. Do you refer exclusively to the dialectic of nature?
Secondly, that claim is yet to be substantiated. Why does one ‘gotta’ ‘add’ any particular dialectics?
Nothing “idealist” exists
Taken at face value, you are claiming that idealist schools of thought do not exist.
If you mean that non-material things do not exist, then you subscribe to a linguistic framework that, among other things, makes engaging with math without compromising on your principles basically impossible, and also means that things like capitalism, social relations in general, numbers, functions, logic (none of which consist of matter) exist.
Trying to make a definition of “materialism” which says human consciousness is simple cells, chemicals, and electric is a straw man of good materialist analyses
This seems rather silly. If defining terms is ‘a straw man (of good materialist analyses)’, then I’m sorry, but how do you expect to communicate what materialism and idealism are? If you actively refuse to explain what you mean by certain words that are not used in a colloquial manner, how do you expect other people to understand you? The same criticism I actually have of philosophers in general as well, as the entire field seems to be actively resistant to properly defining their terms and being understood with minimal ambiguity.
materialist analyses
Also, a pet peeve of mine is how ‘materialist analysis’ is almost always better characterised as ‘political-economical analysis’ in socialist spaces. In particular, my basis for the claim is that such analysis can be done just fine within idealist frameworks, but also because it never actually draws any conclusions from materialism - rather, such analyses draw conclusions from understanding of economic base and superstructure, understanding of private property, understanding of classes.
why they run into the same issues that Plekhanov ran into
What issues did Plekhanov run into?
Are you insinuating that Wittgenstein’s position of linguistic disagreements is applicable to differences of idealism and materialism?
As I have stated, I have not investigated the matter as of yet.
What have you read that made you come to these conclusions? It sounds like you read the encyclopedia entries for these ideas and that’s your basis. Also pulling lots of ‘debate-bro’ tactics, which I don’t appreciate and is influencing the way I’m trying this interaction
Defining materialism as ‘nothing immaterial exists or has any impact on us as material beings’ is fine and correct. But the way you discuss them takes that definition and applies it In a straw-man. ‘nothing immaterial’ doesn’t mean that consciousness is simple electric and chemicals. That’s my point. Complexity and emergence are still material and part of a materialist philosophy once the dislectic is accepted as the relation between and within material
My position, based on Engels. You gotta add Dialectics: material things can combine in such ways that are not singularly traceable to the material basic components, but instead rely on emergent components when they interact. Consciousness as we understand it IS material but is not understood through vulgar materialism which says that it can be broken down into electric signals/chemicals to be understood entirely. This is the way. Dialectics of Nature.
Nothing “idealist” exists, but things not understood in their complete totality do, and emergence is real. But emergence is material, not Magic. Trying to make a definition of “materialism” which says human consciousness is simple cells, chemicals, and electric is a straw man of good materialist analyses. These definitions are all based in a non-dialectical framework and that’s why they run into the same issues that Plekhanov ran into.
Are you insinuating that Wittgenstein’s position of linguistic disagreements is applicable to differences of idealism and materialism?
Firstly, the word ‘dialectic’ doesn’t mean anything specific outside of context. At most, it carries the meaning of ‘something related to change’, and can refer to anything from people having an argument to a framework with theses, antitheses and syntheses of things. Do you refer exclusively to the dialectic of nature?
Secondly, that claim is yet to be substantiated. Why does one ‘gotta’ ‘add’ any particular dialectics?
Taken at face value, you are claiming that idealist schools of thought do not exist.
If you mean that non-material things do not exist, then you subscribe to a linguistic framework that, among other things, makes engaging with math without compromising on your principles basically impossible, and also means that things like capitalism, social relations in general, numbers, functions, logic (none of which consist of matter) exist.
This seems rather silly. If defining terms is ‘a straw man (of good materialist analyses)’, then I’m sorry, but how do you expect to communicate what materialism and idealism are? If you actively refuse to explain what you mean by certain words that are not used in a colloquial manner, how do you expect other people to understand you? The same criticism I actually have of philosophers in general as well, as the entire field seems to be actively resistant to properly defining their terms and being understood with minimal ambiguity.
Also, a pet peeve of mine is how ‘materialist analysis’ is almost always better characterised as ‘political-economical analysis’ in socialist spaces. In particular, my basis for the claim is that such analysis can be done just fine within idealist frameworks, but also because it never actually draws any conclusions from materialism - rather, such analyses draw conclusions from understanding of economic base and superstructure, understanding of private property, understanding of classes.
What issues did Plekhanov run into?
As I have stated, I have not investigated the matter as of yet.
What have you read that made you come to these conclusions? It sounds like you read the encyclopedia entries for these ideas and that’s your basis. Also pulling lots of ‘debate-bro’ tactics, which I don’t appreciate and is influencing the way I’m trying this interaction
Defining materialism as ‘nothing immaterial exists or has any impact on us as material beings’ is fine and correct. But the way you discuss them takes that definition and applies it In a straw-man. ‘nothing immaterial’ doesn’t mean that consciousness is simple electric and chemicals. That’s my point. Complexity and emergence are still material and part of a materialist philosophy once the dislectic is accepted as the relation between and within material
I’m not replying to the rest. Not worth our time