Kill Switch: How the US can ground Europe’s F-35 within 24 hours

written by Lars Wilderang 2025-03-02 13:37

The United States has the ability to ground the F-35 for all or selected European and other buyers within 24 hours and is thus sitting on a kill switch for new fighter aircraft. European democracies should keep their former Eurofighter, F-18 and other advanced aircraft instead of scrapping them and should in the future acquire European fighter aircraft such as Gripen or Rafale, and initiate new joint fighter projects. The information about a kill switch is based on open sources, but also requires an explanation. The countries that bought the F-35 are of course aware of the problem, but they never thought that the US would become a shit circus, but remain a reliable and credible ally and partner.

An article in Asia Times discusses the cybersecurity problems with the F-35, which include the fact that the ODIN and ALIS software must call home to the US daily in order for the aircraft to fly. Cyberattacks could thus disable the F-35 if the necessary servers are brought down or access to them blocked. A quote from Asia Times:

“He points out that ALIS’s complexity, compounded by single points of failure, such as Central Points of Entry (CPE) and the Autonomous Logistics Operating Unit (ALOU), further exacerbates the vulnerability.”

Ett inlägg på LinkedIn nämner också detta:

“F-35 Lightning II: Requires continuous software updates from Lockheed Martin via ALIS/ODIN; without U.S. approval, essential functions could be disabled.”

To put it simply - if the F-35 can be knocked out by cyber-attacks on a single key sensitive point, the US can of course also shut down this access itself. There is no easier cyber attack than the one you carry out on yourself, and it can easily be done by blocking all access via affected computer networks from selected countries. Such blocking of traffic can be done centrally by the US authorities, regardless of what the manufacturer Lockheed thinks about it, and there are many examples globally where specific services are blocked in different countries, such as Signal in Qatar. It is just a matter of implementing a block in central network functions, which somewhat simplified requires a few minutes with a keyboard for those who have the right central authorizations. The US can thus within 24 hours make Europe’s F-35 unusable the next time they have to call home to the United States daily.

The European countries concerned are Belgium, which is acquiring 34 F-35s, Denmark, which is acquiring 27, Italy, which is acquiring 115, the Netherlands with 52, Norway with 52, the UK with 60-80, possibly 138, the Czech Republic with 24, Finland with 64, Germany with 35-45, Greece with 20, Poland with 32-64 and Romania with 48. Then there are countries like Canada, Australia, Singapore, Switzerland, Israel and Japan, all of which could have their F-35s decommissioned if the US government so chooses. These figures are from Wikipedia, so they may be uncertain and not necessarily reflect the latest data.

Europe must keep its former fighter jets operational and equipped, i.e. Eurofighter Typhoon, Panavia Tornado, F-16, F-18 etc. Sweden flies the Gripen, which does not have this problem but is controlled by Sweden as a domestic aircraft even if there were call-home functions, and France its own Rafale. It may also be appropriate, if possible, to withdraw from the F-35 contracts due to costs and delays and order Gripen or Rafale instead, and immediately start new projects for new own European fighter aircraft, but never again put all your eggs in the same basket as with the F-35, but it is appropriate to continue to have at least three different planes - French, Swedish and European.

The performance and function of the F-35 is also a matter of debate, but another. The US has tried to build a Swiss Army knife that will solve all problems, but has instead become expensive and over-complicated. With modern radar developments, it is also debatable whether stealth capabilities are any longer particularly valuable. Sure, stealth capabilities render many older radar systems useless, but modern radar can see the plane anyway. A modern radar today can find a civilian small drone, which has less radar surface than an F-35.

The F-35 was mainly delivered and ordered during the war on terror, when the threat was peasant armies in the Third World, and unlike the Gripen and other older fighter aircraft, it may not be suitable for full-scale war. It is certainly not tested in a full-scale war where the war is not limited to duels in air combat or chasing the opponent’s air defenses in SEADS. Today, the threat is the dimensional Russian opponent, which can operate in all arenas of war, including the cyber arena. But the biggest threat to the F-35 sits in the White House, an oval office that so far with the new regime has shown to not give a damn about the US defense industry, which is otherwise the one that receives 90+% of US military aid to Ukraine, but now looks to have this taken away. Blocking a country’s F-35 would of course completely torpedo Lockheed Martin and perhaps the entire US defense industry, but so far the new regime seems to not give a damn about that industry. There is also a significant risk that the new regime will not give a damn about its supposed allies and may at any time want to force a capitulation to the Russians. The maintenance and operation of the F-35 is also complicated and more difficult to carry out in field conditions with temporary (road) bases, but requires proper air bases. This is in contrast to Gripen, which can be serviced by rapidly trained conscripts under field conditions, as the system was developed for the requirements of full-scale invasion warfare during the Cold War.

Relatedly, the US is also holding the regular release of crypto keys to the Link 16 communications protocol, which is currently used by NATO fighter and air defense aircraft, including Gripen and Patriot. If the US refuses to release new keys, critical data communication between e.g. fighter command and aircraft will be disrupted, with digital airborne situational awareness being lost. It is of course possible to fly anyway via radio communication, but you are thrown back 50 years in time to before we had these air situation pictures already on the old Viggen. A description of the key management for Link 16 can be read here. However, Link 16 is a software issue where the West can certainly switch to another system at cost and time when it has developed its own air defense or aircraft (not F-35 or Patriot), but for systems where you do not have access to the software, it is probably screwed.

The conclusion is that the US and the regime in the White House have a strong hold on Europe’s defense in the form of a kill switch and can specifically with the air defense on Putin’s behalf or if they want to force a European surrender (“peace”) for Russia threaten to put a lot of European fighter aircraft on the ground and possibly also knock out data communication via Link 16. So we will see what these countries choose - support Ukraine and risk taking out their own air force?

Countries such as Finland bought the F-35 in the belief that they were also buying American protection, as Sweden thought when it bought the Patriot instead of the Franco-Italian SAMP/T. Instead, they may have bought a Trojan horse.