Prior court cases have established that unconstitutional state action includes not just (1) the state’s exercise of “coercive power,” but also (2) when the state “provide[s] such significant encouragement, either overt or covert” to private conduct; (3) when “private actors” operate as “a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents”; and (4) when the “formally ‘private’” action “may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action.” Furthermore, case precedent has established that specific features of the government’s action may combine to create a compelling case for state action, especially where (5) a federal statute has immunized private conduct.

As we argued in extensive detail in our motion for the preliminary injunction, all these factors are present in the government’s actions: (1) coercion, (2) significant encouragement, (3) joint participation, (4) entwinement, and (5) legal immunity [Section 230 protections] combined with other factors [implicit and explicit threats of removing broad immunity].