Summary

Lockheed Martin UK’s chief, Paul Livingston, defended the F-35 stealth jet program after Elon Musk called it obsolete due to advances in unmanned drones.

Livingston emphasized the F-35’s unmatched capabilities, including stealth, battlefield data-sharing, and cost-efficiency by replacing multiple aircraft types.

While Musk labeled the program overly expensive and poorly designed, Livingston argued drones alone can’t match the F-35’s capabilities or defend against threats like China’s J20 jets.

Despite criticism over cost and reliability, the F-35 remains integral to NATO defenses, with widespread adoption across 19 nations, including the UK.

  • perestroika@lemm.ee
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    21 hours ago

    That is also why Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and several other countries aren’t planning to get any. Easier to let others have fighters, based in safer locations. Always possible to bring them forward to local air fields.

    South Korea doesn’t have a rear area to rely on, even its capital is in artillery range from the north - it has no plan B except overcoming the opponent very fast (to decapitate a command chain, you need stealth strikes through their air defense).

    Japan is an island far from the mainland - plenty of advance warning about an incoming ballistic payload. Poland has strategic depth like Ukraine. Greece doesn’t have that kind of a neigbour, but otherwise would qualify. Since it has very articulated landscape, it must optimize its ability for naval and air operations, so it needs good planes.

    Romania and Finland are the countries in your list that fit my categories and make me think - maybe there is some benefit to a country with small strategic depth in having a very expensive air force.

    In case of Finland, they have a large GDP per capita (enough to sustain an expensive project) and want their airforce to survive in range of the St. Petersburg air defense district of Russia (relatively densely armed). I think that, given the options (Jas-39 Gripen vs. F-35), they decided that “we must have an air force” and “nothing but a stealth air force will last in predictable conditions”.

    In case of Romania, I keep wondering why they chose it. I think they simply added Ukraine to their strategic depth calculation and and concluded “we have plenty of strategic depth, there will be lots of advance warning if anyone comes at us over Ukraine”.

    As for hardened hangars, the last ones over here (Estonia) to have them were the Soviets/Russians. Forward-deployed allied planes spend their time in lightly built above-ground hangars. I have no doubt in the planners knowing the state of the art. They simply aren’t that optimistic. There is every expectation that in case of war, planes cannot stay, but must temporarily retreat out of harm’s way. But you are correct to mention hardened shelters for planes, they should exist. But if one wants to keep operating in range of SRBM-s and attack drones - hardened everything, not just hardened hangars. (Sweden for example decided it wouldn’t have hardened everything, and designed a domestic fighter capable of flying off straight stretches of paved road.)

    To summarize: if you foresee fighting in a phone booth, don’t choose a longsword. :)

    • skillissuer@discuss.tchncs.de
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      18 hours ago

      in case of poland, you’re forgetting about ballistic missiles stationed in belarus and kaliningrad. in case of japan and to some degree south korea, there are also possible adversary’s naval assets